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Abstract 
This article identifies problematic tendencies in current analyses of the Middle East’s energy relations. 
There is a tendency to see all social relations as determined by resource extraction, use and transfer, 
contributing to the uniquely instable social relations of the Middle East. The combination of weak 
governance and geological over-determination continues to damage the region’s fragile ecology. 
Under these conditions, social structures are incapable to react to new crises, such as the effects of 
global climate change. This article offers an alternative, more optimistic perspective on the Middle 
East’s energy relations. Privileging the social over the material, calorific, geological or topographic 
dimensions of energy relations, it argues that social life developed in relation to its natural resources, 
matter and energy, but is not singularly determined by it. It proposes to historicise and, thereby, re-
politicise the Middle East’s social energy relations, including its nutritional and geopolitical 
dimensions. This reveals their spatio-temporally dynamic, rather than materially determined 
character. Energy is subsequently re-defined into a political category, a field of social change rather 
than a limiting biophysical structure. The concept of Social Energy, thus, transforms nature from a 
constraining externality into an integral part of social analysis and transformation in the Middle East. 
1 Introduction 
The current global conjuncture is dominated by a multiplicity of crises. The financial crisis of 2007/8 
remains unresolved while Europe finds itself in the midst of a so-called ‘refugee crisis’, itself 
accompanied by a crisis of political sovereignty in the Middle East. This constellation appears to have 
turned into a political crisis in the West, too, with the rise of populist right-wing politics. Despite 
multiple sources of uncertainty, the hydro-carbon economy keeps growing, further aggravating the 
effects of anthropogenic global climate change. In sum, the world is at an intersection of crises, not 
infrequently formulated around the politics of oil or fossilised forms of energy. This concurs with the 
typically orientalised imagery of an instable political landscape in the Middle East where this ‘abyss’ is 
thought to be most evident. Providing simplistic, regionalised answers to complex global questions, 
such deterministic and orientalist narratives are not only problematic with regards to the Middle East 
itself. They obscure the inner workings of global crises, narrowing their origins geographically, offering 
mechanistic explanations, from population growth to cultural essentialisms and ‘sectarian clashes’ 
instead of meaningful social analysis.  
This article reverses this logic by re-centring the Middle East’s energy relations at the heart of an 
optimistic, rather than dystopian vision. It maps out a different, dialectical understanding of nature-
society relations. In doing so, it develops the ‘Social Energy’ approach, privileging the social over the 
material, calorific, geological or topographic dimensions of energy. Thus, energy is not treated as 
biophysical matter, but as historically and geographically specific set of social relations. This is not only 
meant to improve the analysis of energy politics. Social life, it argues, developed in relation to its 
natural resources, including matter and energy, but is not necessarily determined by it. It proposes to 
historicise and, thereby, re-politicise the Middle East’s social energy relations. This reveals the spatio-
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temporally dynamic, rather than materially determined character of ‘Social Energy’. Energy is, thus, 
understood here as a political category, a field of social change rather than a limiting biophysical 
structure. The concept of Social Energy, thus, transforms nature from an asocial, quantitative 
constraining externality into an integral part of social analysis and also, crucially, a potential source of 
social transformation in the Middle East. Finally, this paper will evidence this potential for 
emancipatory social change around Social Energy in historical practice detailing the case of the so-
called ‘Rojava’ revolution in Northern Syria.  
Energy politics in the Middle East is seen as more political than elsewhere. Energy and energy security 
are not only policy concerns, energy is frequently portrayed as integral to the many everyday conflicts 
in the region. For example, the never ending intra-Palestinian feud between Hamas and Fatah is 
carried out via Gaza’s electricity supply from Israel. The Palestinian Authority (PA) stopped funding the 
already deprived coastal strip’s supplies, leaving it not just without electricity, but also without 
substantial services such as waste water treatment and health services [21]. Saudi Arabia’s geopolitical 
ambitions, enabled by the abundance of oil and the arms funded by its revenues, has not only become 
more interventionist in the region, but has also maintained low prices to undermine revenue and 
power of its rivals and competitors [72]. Both of these developments equally demonstrate political 
strengths as well as vulnerabilities related to energy, demonstrating that energy is ubiquitous in 
Middle East politics. No analysis of the region’s complex relations is thought to be complete without 
considering at least an ‘energy’ component. Over time, however, the perception of this component 
has changed from being an enviable source of unlimited wealth to a poisonous curse, a social ill. While 
the need for hydrocarbon consumption has survived all political and economic crises in the West, the 
Middle East has gone through many ruptures in its relationship with energy. 
Despite this centrality, surprisingly, notions of ‘energy’ or ‘energy security’ are mostly taken for 
granted and are hardly ever specified, let alone discussed [42]. Based on the region’s geology, most 
‘energy’ analyses of the Middle East, from security to geopolitics to political economy, remain 
focussed on hydrocarbons. Water-energy relations [62] and hydro-electric potentials are analysed 
within the context of transboundary river regimes, usually in relation to irrigation for agriculture. Apart 
from the financing of dam construction, water relations are rarely meaningfully related to the 
hydrocarbon economy. Similarly, analyses of renewable energy sources focus on the potential for 
solar and wind production for local use and potential electricity transfers to Europe, which still raises 
issues with vulnerability and security [45]. They are, however, hardly ever related to the complex geo-
political constellations within which they emerge [52].  
What remains constant throughout time, space and different approaches to the Middle East’s energy 
relations is an understanding of its environment as an exceptional case. This can come in the form of 
unprecedented riches, hardship, resource deprivation but is generally seen as ‘unnatural nature’. The 
same humanity considered to be in control of its own destiny in subjugating nature in the north is 
disproportionately dominated by an environment not conducive to stability or development in the 
Middle East. This and the centrality of fossil resources to any analysis of the Middle East remain 
dominant in academic, journalistic and policy accounts [16]. Even if scarcity doesn’t necessarily lead 
to outright conflict, the Middle East’s political order is still seen as being dominated by its 
environment. Ever since Karl Witfogel’s description of Oriental Empires having centralized politically 
due to their irrigation needs [74], an orientalist environmental determinism remains a popular form 
of analysing Middle East politics. Precarious environments and the assumed mismanagement by local 
elites served as a pretext for colonial rule in the name of paradoxically both rescuing as well as 
appropriating a ‘pristine’ nature [17]. Postcolonial states, via their ambition to project power in an 
insecure environment, are alleged to have reverted to the local mismanaged of both nature and 
government. More recently, climate change supposedly revealed the lack of ‘resilience’ or ‘adaptive 
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capacities’ of these states. Arguments about Sudan’s and Syria’s civil wars being triggered by climate 
change [40],[61], collapsing the already fragile and dysfunctional post-colonial order into inevitable 
wars and devastation, close the cycle of modern ‘Environmental Orientalism’ in the ecological 
imaginaries of the Middle East.  
 
This modern reading stands in sharp contrast to the emphasis of the Middle East’s lush and productive 
environments, the origins of human agricultural cultivation in Mesopotamia and Palestine, making it 
the Biblical cradle of humanity itself. Even in the contemporary world, the Middle Eastern 
environment’s perceived precarity can be contrasted with its central role in the global hydro-carbon 
economy and increasingly also the services industry. Different forms of appropriating nature are, thus, 
thought to sustain as much disrupt systems of rule, from the postcolonial all the way to the ‘Islamic’ 
state [20]. This is mirrored in the schizophrenic relationship to fossil fuel. This source of wealth [38], 
having degenerated into an outright “curse” [73], is now portrayed as inviting corruption, conflict and 
neo-colonialism. Once a catalyst of progress and development, the fossil curse is now thought to 
inhibit the kind of ‘sustainable’ social change beneficial for humans and nature alike.  
 
This tension-ridden relationship between the ‘precarious’ environment and the political structures it 
generates, imposes or, indeed, destabilises, used to be expressed only in relation to water, climate 
and agriculture. Fossil energy, though a more recent discovery, is seen as just a disruptive social force 
in the Middle East’s socio-political development. However, it’s not just the hydro-carbon discoveries 
themselves that are meant to be problematic. Energy transfer routes, usually in the form of pipelines, 
invite conspiracy theories about the over-determination of the region’s geopolitics. Syria’s civil war 
quickly became a ‘Pipelineistan War’ [54],[47], where the US and Iran allegedly not only compete over 
Syria’s resources, but also over major East-West energy transfer routes [23]. This emphasis on hydro-
carbons as central to all Middle East geopolitics somewhat mirrors deterministic arguments about 
climate-change. A picture of the Middle East emerges that explains all conflicts, if not all social 
relations altogether with the absence or presence of its ecological features, from transboundary 
waters to geology to the topography relevant for energy transfers. It not only thought to explain the 
Middle East’s own policies, but also those towards the region. Unsaturable ‘Western’ demand for oil 
supposedly imposes an imperial onslaught, generating all sorts of morbid phenomena, from the 
‘rentier’ to the ‘petro’ [41], to the outright ‘failed’ state.    
 
This article identifies these problematic tendencies in dealing with the Middle East’s energy relations 
as a triple determinism. First, there is a tendency to understand all social relations as related to, if not 
determined by, the region’s energy resources. Second, all resource extraction, use and transfer is 
thought to either cause or contribute to the uniquely instable social relations of the Middle East. Third, 
the combination of weak or morbid governance and geological over-determinism continues to 
damage the region’s inherently fragile ecology. The socio-ecological damage, thus, supposedly 
becomes mutually reinforcing and irreversible. This Neo-Malthusian worldview, infused with an 
Orientalist understanding of the Middle East, offers little hope for escaping the resource, energy and 
social curses of the Middle East. While frequently criticised, the inherent resource and “energy 
reductionisms” [10, p 116] are rarely challenged directly. Resource curse, ‘pipeline wars’ and simplistic 
rentier state arguments remain popular also with otherwise critical analyses. In other words, while a 
deterministic and reductionist reading of the Middle East’s energy relations is commonly accepted as 
a problem, little remedy is offered. The emphasis on quantitative positivistic energy studies, thus, 
continuously reproduces conventional analyses, making conflictual energy relations a self-fulfilling 
prophecy.  
 
The following offers an alternative understanding of the Middle East’s energy relations as social 
relations. It argues that, as elsewhere in the world, social life in the region developed historically “as 
an intricate web of relationships and flows of matter and energy” [38]. While this approach is by no 
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means uniquely applicable to the Middle East, it is here that it proves not only most useful but also 
the most urgent for countering deterministic readings. The Middle East’s energy relations, thus 
historicised and re-politicised, are seen as spatio-temporally specific. Nature is re-defined away from 
a biophysical, constraining element, into a social and political category, a field of socio-political 
struggle. ‘Social Energy’, therefore, moves from an asocial externality to an integral part of social 
analysis and, politically, to a source for potential social transformation.  
 
This argument will be set out in three steps. First, the notion of energy as a social relation will be 
developed, denaturalizing the current carbon-based growth regime. Energy will be defined as a social 
relation that exceeds the relationship between hydro-carbons, electricity and social power. Going 
beyond purely chemical or economic properties of energy suggests an inclusion of nutrients, soils and 
human muscular labour as sources of energy. It also suggests a wider reading of the social and includes 
a historically sensitive notion of geopolitics. Second, this argument is contextualized in the Middle 
East, where conventional orientalist narratives of the region as a fragile and restrictive ecology and 
society are challenged. Using a single case study, it proceeds by identifying the unique but telling case 
of Social Energy in practice in the northern Syrian federal autonomy region (‘Rojava’, Kurdish for 
‘southern Kurdistan’) and its ‘Social Ecology’ approach. Demonstrating the politically dynamic and 
potentially emancipatory, rather than restrictive nature of energy and its concrete social 
appropriation through a cooperative economy, the paper will close by arguing in favour of a ‘Social 
Energy’ approach, based on the careful historicisation of all social energy relations.  
 
 
1 Energy as a Social Relation 
Energy is usually understood in quantifiable terms, from kilo joules to kilowatt hours, millions of tons 
of oil equivalent or calories as a measure of nutritious value, to name but a few. Though energy can 
potentially take on a wide variety of social meanings, this quantifiable, kinetic understanding of energy 
remains dominant. Building on the biophysical quantification, its economic, monetized value, 
determined by international energy markets, informs most social science analyses as well as the 
practices and policies of securitizing energy [48]. Most social science literature, including that in 
International Relations (IR) has taken little note of the social dimensions of energy, and largely works 
with conventionally measured forms. Instead of infusing ‘energy’ with a social dimension, mechanistic 
laws of motion are also applied to the social world. The ultimate problem, then is that social energy 
relations are understood as an asocial mathematical reflection of bio-physical or chemical properties. 
Their economic value for social reproduction is accounted for by the ‘raw’ data only. More 
problematically, still, the inter-sections of nature and society, from hydro-scarcity to mineral 
abundance, are seen as extensions of a quasi-natural mechanism.  
 
Instead of ‘adding’ energy to social analyses, what is suggested here is to understand energy research 
as a mode of social analysis itself. Without entirely rejecting those quantitative measurements, the 
social analysis suggested here moves beyond these economistic measures of nature. Most accounts 
on energy in the Middle East focus on minerals and/or fossil energy as highly flexible, mobile and high 
value resources around which the global political economic order was constructed. More recently, 
climate change research adds to this picture by accounting for the heat and emission dimensions of 
global energy flows. Different forms of energy relations, such as those emerging from the harvesting 
of gravitational energy through hydro-electric dams, complement this picture [51]. New sources of 
energy, and, specifically, new forms of electricity production, harvesting natural flows, such as wind 
and solar, are conventionally seen as challenging traditional power relations [29], but they may well 
serve to maintain them, too.  
 
The production of space and nature [63] also implies the social production of energy, rather than only 
a passive harvesting of dormant potentials. This dialectical understanding of society and nature, thus, 
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tries to overcome notions of energy purely as a commodity to be valorized in international markets 
and fought over by powerful states [14]. It aims to understand energy as an eminently social category, 
from the human body to large-scale infrastructure projects and global markets. This also implies that 
quantitatively measured energy resources are not merely physical, but also political. First, their 
emergence is closely related to the disciplining and subjugation of nature, both conceptually as well 
as materially. This is especially true in the case of the colonial subjugation of nature. Colonisation was 
quickly followed by post-colonial state building projects, many of which adopted and expanded the 
colonial economies. From British citrus cultivation and cotton plantations to the dam and irrigation 
construction projects of Non-Aligned states, most articulations of power, not least those opposing the 
West, involved forms of subjugating nature akin to the colonial regimes. More recently, nature’s 
appropriation was led by its commodification in liberalised global markets and, more specifically, its 
financialisation [63].  
 
Looking beyond its ‘pure’ calorific and economic value for providing heat, mobility and electricity as a 
physical dimension of the global circulation of capital, emphasizing the social dimension is evidently 
more difficult to capture in social analyses [31]. The logic of 21st century financial capitalism 
characterised by an extensive use of algorithms [43], depends heavily on an automatized calculation 
of risk at the expense of qualitative human judgement. These structural changes, along with positivist 
social sciences informing policy making, privilege the kinetic over the social dimension of energy, not 
because they are more meaningful, but because physical quantities can be automatized more easily. 
There are of course physical, topographic and kinetic dimensions of energy within financial capitalism. 
While ‘pristine’ nature is increasingly financialized [78], most of the highly abstract risk, debt and 
derivative economies are more physical than is conventionally perceived. Not only does the 
production of hardware and processing capacity depend on energy resources. Financialisation also 
has implications for muscular energy, or labour, as the primary source for digital labour and the ‘gig 
economy’ [79]. The relationship between energy and social power is therefore not exhausted by the 
politics of minerals and hydro-carbons. Other forms of energy, especially food and labour, are geared 
into this increasingly automatized social energy metabolism. Given the intricate web of social relations 
within which energy occurs and by which it is transformed, the implied potential for social power is, 
however, much more difficult to understand. 
  
Evidently, there is qualitative work trying to map these complexities, relating physical energy to social 
relations. The political economy, sociology and anthropology of energy deals with social energy 
relations. Some reflect on the role of producing technical knowledge in the making of energy policy 
[30], while others look at actual or potential conflicts around decarbonization, resource conflicts, or 
old and new ‘energy imperialisms’ [26]. The concept of ‘energopower’, for example, looks at the way 
in which the maintenance of Foucault’s ‘biopower’ depends on the control of electricity and fuel [9].  
 
Timothy Mitchell’s work is particularly remarkable and applicable to the Middle East. It goes beyond 
a simplistic ‘rentier state’ model, problematizing the relationship between the actual production, 
processing and distribution of fossil resources and forms of social power [50]. Instead of maintaining 
a ‘carbon autocracy’ argument, his careful historicisation of socio-political energy relations 
demonstrates how the extraction and global re-insertion of mobile fossil energy and their maritime 
logistics helped disempowering labour movements which had controlled ‘fixed’ coal resources and 
railway transport. This relationship between different sources of energy and the reproduction of 
socio-political power, thus, produces spatio-temporally specific, rather than mechanistic social 
outcomes in energy producing and consuming countries alike [50]. While it also relates to local power 
relations, ‘carbon statecraft’ [8], is not immovable and bears global implications. Here, Mitchell points 
to the particularly important relation between energy and finance. For example, the reinvestment of 
oil revenues also includes intermediary effects far away from the original sites of oil production and 
consumption. Fossil energy, from coal to hydro-carbons, is indeed strongly related to the reproduction 
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of social power in various complex ways. Similarly, research on hydropolitics demonstrates that the 
engineering of water resources is not just designed to harvest gravitational energy, control floods and 
abstract irrigation water [66]. Water infrastructure is frequently used to ‘hydro-demographically’ 
engineer societies, displace minorities [33] or project power geo-politically [36]. These different forms 
of energy also relate to one another: Hydrocarbon revenues and the associated finance industry are 
central for funding large hydro-electric schemes. Irrigation infrastructure, in turn, is central for 
industrialised agriculture and, hence, food security, which is always a strategic concern for states in 
the Middle East. Oil revenues fuel further, frequently unsustainable investment in land and 
agriculture, mostly in Africa [75],[13]. These investments in irrigation schemes are, in turn, related to 
other practices of social engineering, land grabs and the violent introduction of new labour regimes 
[44].  
 
These various complex relations suggest a re-thinking of the relationship between energy and power 
beyond the fossil fuel and electricity infrastructure. Other related social energetic relations not 
captured by the conventional literature include, most importantly, the energetic implications of 
agricultural development, food production and the nutrition they produce. These, in turn, relate to 
property and labour, or muscular regimes, usually organised by political communities. These 
communities, in turn, relate to one another, sometimes in geopolitically competitive or cooperative 
ways. All of these are integral parts of the social infrastructure through which energetic matter 
circulates.  
 
Nutrients of the soil, lost through unsustainable forms of agriculture, are also nutrients for human 
energy. Biophysically, the energetic value of food is not exhausted in measurable calories, but food is 
also a source of human metabolic energy and, by extension, public health. While not directly a source 
of energy in and of itself, public health and the institutions maintaining it are central to maintaining 
the circulation of energy through human and animal bodies within highly toxic modern societies. This, 
in turn, relates to a central category in all social analysis: human labour. Spatio-temporally specific 
labour regimes relate to specific forms of irrigation and other forms of environmental management. 
These are embedded within global value chains and determined by local, national and international 
agricultural, food security, development and health policies. Understanding metabolic social energy 
relations [60], thus, directly includes nutrition and indirectly healthcare provisions to account for all 
social energy relations beyond the more rehearsed hydro-carbon/electricity link.  
 
Looking at those metabolic social energy relations reveals the increasingly “unhealthy circulation of 
matter”, as Marx described it [11, p12], within human bodies, eco-systems, and, by extension, 
societies. Energy, labour, social property relations and soil fertility are in fact closely related in their 
increased overexploitation. Engels described how the closure of common land in Germany had led 
peasants to intensify energy use (initially in the form of cattle, later including fertilizers and industrial 
mechanisation) to maintain income and yields while cultivating less land [25, p116]. This 
intensification of both human exertion in the form of wage labour and non-human extraction of 
energy in the form of soil nutrients leads to increased environmental degradation and infertile land. 
Human physiology, the base of labour power, is similarly strained and can be physically harmed by the 
excessive release of heat, toxins and unhealthy circulation of matter more generally. The combination 
of environmental and human harm consequently also tires societal structures in general, straining 
health and other public services. More than just an over-extraction of soil nutrients, industrialised 
global food regimes are integral to this process. With an increased investment in land by foreign 
investors, they also constitute another form of south-north energy transfers. Over-extracted 
nutrients, entered into high protein diets, are usually consumed by wealthier populations in the global 
north. This unequal relationship of exchange is not dissimilar to the trade in hydro-carbons.  
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This is not to suggest that social energy relations are bio-physically determined. Rather, social energy 
relations need to be contextualised within historically specific forms of power. This includes 
technologies of energy extraction, production, consumption, transmission and storage, generated by 
specific social formations. For example, the invention of the internal combustion engine by a German 
engineer didn’t revolutionise the world economy. It was only its mass production within the US 
capitalist social formation that this innovation became the core of a new industrial age and, eventually 
a new global order. Institutionalised labour regimes, urban planning centred around mortgage fuelled 
real estate expansion, which in turn required individual mobility, usually based on hydro-carbons are 
all elements in this order. This model of growth was globally transmitted in the post-war years through 
international financial institutions. To this day, industrial policies around the world tend to see the 
automotive, energy, real estate and finance industries as pivotal to processes of ‘development’ and 
growth. Politically, however, these policies tend to consolidate north-south power inequalities implied 
in the international division of labour. Despite the growth in renewables, there’s no sign of abating 
this trend. Global data flows are still based on vast electricity, mineral and cooling resources. Fossil 
fuelled global air travel and high-volume shipping, including that in minerals themselves, remain major 
pillars of this order.  
 
Economic and fiscal policies are also geared into this post-45 global energy regime. The planning of 
public, hydro-carbon based infrastructure, financed with the help of international donors, institutions 
and markets, maintains growth as much as it maintains hegemonic power relations. It also sustains 
the continued carbon based urban planning, including mass transport. These relate to the increased 
casualisation of ‘flexible’ labour. Priced out of the booming, if speculative real estate markets closer 
to the commercial centres, even average income earners are forced into urban peripheries, generating 
increased demand for transport. This post-war regime also carries additional public health 
implications. Human energy sustaining this labour power is harmed by having become more sedentary 
and yet more mobile at the same time. Fed by the supply of high energy industrialised diets causes 
problems from obesity to malnutrition to cardiac disease [57]. At the intersection of the global social 
and the human metabolisms, these energy transfers maintain old and create new global inequalities, 
exploiting soils, nutrients and labour in the south before channelling their energy content to wealthier 
parts of the world where they create unhealthy abundances. At the same time, they maintain 
hegemonic forms of rule.  
 
Even if looked at more holistically, energy transfers are not just carried out by global markets. 
Transnational capital relations co-exist within a system of nation-states, many of which have related, 
if not always outright competitive energy and development policies. Much of traditional geopolitics, 
broadly defined as the question of how geo-physical space is politicised, remains within the neo-
Malthusian/realist paradigm of a generic, a priori assumed and under-specified competition over 
territory and scarce resources. Geopolitics in the current context of social energy relations is 
understood here more widely as the relationship between society and nature, mediated by the 
interaction between different societies, or ‘the international’. Critical political economy, inspired by 
world systems theory has reflected on the international and its energy implications, focussing on 
unequal relations of exchange, primarily in the form of resource trade [26]. Though drawing out this 
relation is important, it nevertheless neglects the historical conditions under which the global South 
emerged and continues to develop. These conditions include, most importantly, that of colonialism 
and subsequent competitive post-colonial state developmentalism. Not only is the world’s indivisible 
biosphere in fact divided into multiple jurisdictions. They have also entered a process of competitive 
development, not reducible to conflict. The relationship between geopolitics and energy, therefore, 
goes beyond the classic distinctions between realist pessimistic expectations conflict, liberal optimistic 
expectations of trade and cooperation or Marxist expectations of neo-colonial domination and 
resource extraction. Rather than assuming universal outcomes a priori, the concrete forms these 
relations take, remains historically specific. Inter-societal relations always do relate directly to the way 
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in which nature is appropriated. This frequently takes on a competitive, sometimes a cooperative and 
not always a conflictual nature. Understood in those terms, geopolitics carries major biophysical as 
well as social, but by no means pre-determined energetic implications.  
 
Before proceeding to the next section of how this social understanding of energy applies to the 
contemporary Middle East and how such an analysis can improve our understanding of the region 
more generally, the following will summarize the core assumptions developed above. First, it was 
argued that energy, rather than being ‘accurately’ represented by quantitative calorific or electric 
measures, is in fact better understood as a social, historically specific category. Energy understood as 
a social relation is, thus, not universal, transhistorical or easily, if at all, quantifiable. Rather, it is socially  
and spatio-temporally specific. Social Energy is, thus, part of a notion of the social metabolism which 
approaches nature-society relations as a whole. Economically as well as ecologically societies’ 
exchange relations are not just with other societies, but with all material and energetic matter. The 
lens of social metabolism, thus, doesn’t merely look at the usage of energy, or input alone, but looks 
at the entirety of the energetic cycle, or physical throughput of a socio-economic system, including 
humanity as part of all living matter [80]. The social metabolism is, therefore, not reducible to 
mechanistic laws of nature.  
 
This applies to the Middle East in peculiar ways. Here hydro-carbons simultaneously represent easy 
access to wealth and power as well as a potentially degenerative social and ecological poison. Second, 
it was emphasized that the conventional focus on minerals and hydro-power overlooks a crucial 
element in the global social energy metabolism, namely nutrition and, by extension, health. This not 
only includes agriculture, soil and climate, but also food itself as a source of energy, i.e. the conditions 
for human social reproduction in the form of labour and the public institutions that maintain it. Third, 
it was argued that ‘energy’, thus socially defined, is mediated not only by a global, universalising and 
homogenising capitalist world market, led by the financial industry, but also by geopolitics understood 
as the historically specific ways in which societies interact in their appropriation of nature. Without 
reducing these geopolitical energy relations to a simplistic ‘scramble for resources’ narrative, the 
Middle East is indeed conditioned by competitive post-colonial state building projects. The following 
will situate these arguments empirically within the context of the Middle East and northern Syria more 
specifically.   
 
2 Social Energy Relations in the Middle East 
In many ways, the Middle East is a region where the complex relationship between conventional 
understandings of energy, agriculture, food and geopolitics plays out in the most obvious fashion. The 
region’s endemic problems with socio-political and ecological instability in an energy rich environment 
can be read into the multiple contemporary crises and conflicts. Especially conventional hydro-carbon 
energy relations from Libya to Syria continue to serve as explanations for the origin and escalation of 
conflicts [36],[1]. Control over resources is thought to motivate conflicting parties, be that 
“revolutionary states,” [15] old and new imperial powers [76]. In sum, Middle Eastern society is 
thought to be dominated by the political economy of mineral extraction and the imperial powers 
competing over those resources.  
 
Though not all states match this description, the ‘rentier’ state model has become a popular way to 
analyse the proto Middle Eastern state under these conditions. Typically, these states extract rents 
from hydrocarbon extraction. An oligopolistic energy market and a geopolitical umbrella provided for 
by a ‘hegemonic’ West maintaining carbon capitalism [18] sustains oil-producing authoritarian elites 
[5]. Crucially, the political maintenance of these regimes doesn’t require taxation which would 
necessitate political compromises. In combination with the arms industry’s abundant supplies in 
exchange for petro-dollars, this allows for a greater degree of autocracy and cronyism than would be 
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possible elsewhere [59]. Harvesting these rents also works as a disincentive to develop a meaningful 
industry and a politically powerful labour force that comes with it. This sets in motion a path of highly 
uneven development, harvesting cheap casual labour from the third world, expanding oil-revenue 
funded services, logistics and real estate sectors. Though this ‘model’ is developed mostly with a view 
to the relatively homogenous block of the Arab oil producing member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), it is frequently applied to other producing states and came to represent the region’s 
political nature as a whole.   
 
Elements of this concept are applied to societies and regimes as diverse as Iran’s theocracy to an 
effectively ‘failed’ (or ‘failing’) state of the Syrian Arab Republic. All (geo)politics is related to or 
determined by its relation to hydro-carbon resources. Iran’s engagement in the Syrian Civil War is at 
least as much motivated by its desire to secure a hydro-carbon export route through its Mediterranean 
coastline as by its support for the Lebanese Hezbollah [34]. In the wider region, geopolitically powerful 
and influential states like Egypt and Turkey, while not meaningful producers in themselves, are still 
seen to be determined by the regional geopolitics of energy [68], aspiring for a role as ‘energy transfer 
hub’ [19],[69]. ‘Normalization’ deals between Turkey and its former adversary Israel have caused many 
analysts to identify the energy link as the ultimate cause for what amounts to a dramatic foreign policy 
shifts [28].  
 
These examples illustrate a common over-emphasis of energy when analysing the Middle East’s social 
fabric and its geopolitical relations. Understanding the Middle East as a dysfunctional export oriented 
primary commodity producer subject to imperial interests not only neglects its role as a source of 
demand, consumption, distribution and transformation of energy. It also tends to under-specify the 
nature of individual societies, their historical conditions of emergence and the central, but socially 
complex role of energy in these state-building projects. As elsewhere, the post-war growth regime 
didn’t create a homogenous world after capitalism’s own image. Neither did it produce homogenous 
societies amongst producer countries in the region, following a ‘logic’ of hydrocarbon capital 
accumulation.  
 
As Adam Hanieh convincingly argued, not even the seemingly homogenous block of the GCC countries 
can be subsumed under the same logic [32]. One of its member states, Qatar, is currently under a 
regime of sanctions by its fellow rentiers, necessitating food supplies via air links. This example vividly 
demonstrates the dynamic relation between all different forms of energy, the reproduction of social 
power and geopolitics in the Middle East. It also shows that a static rentier state theory cannot capture 
the complexities of the contemporary Middle East. Despite its mineral wealth, Qatar’s and the Middle 
East’s energy relations are far from fixed or stable. Rather than combining energy determinism with 
similarly problematic identity politics, sociology of religion or culture, what is suggested here is a 
greater specification of the historical origins of energy relations and how they enter the social and 
geopolitical fabric of the Middle East. More specifically, many of the origins of both energy production 
and consumption can be found in the various national developmentalist projects. These, in turn, are 
rooted in colonial legacies and the historical development of competitive post-colonial regimes, the 
legacies of the cold war and new forms of imperialism [2].  
 
3 Syria’s Old and New Energy Relations  
Hence, the current critique is not so much meant as a denial of the importance of energy or oil for 
understanding the Middle East and its conflicts. It does, however, try to overcome a simplistic 
understanding of ‘energy as hydro-carbons’ and an over-determination of society by them. ‘Social 
energy’ means that, apart from oil, it is land, soil, food, nutrition and the associated social property 
relations that need to be analysed to allow for a more holistic understanding of energy relations in the 
Middle East. Hydro-carbons, while still relevant, have served to obscure other, similarly or sometimes 
even more important energy relations. For example, the role or politics of bread supply and subsidies 
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in the Middle East has long been emphasised as one of key strategic importance [46]. In the case of 
the Syrian civil war, conflicts over wheat [22], its pricing [24], the supply of seeds or the flour delivered 
by international humanitarian aid agencies [4] are as important as the access to electricity, diesel to 
fuel military operations or maintaining or gaining control over any strategic territory.  
In order to fully understand these complex social energy relations by way of example, the following 
will develop a deeper understanding of some of the energy relations of the Syrian civil war. It will first 
elaborate on the political developments that gave rise to the current situation before looking at 
alternative forms of energy relations in the northern Syrian autonomy regions. This will demonstrate 
the socially complex, politically dynamic forms of energy present in the region. It will close by 
emphasizing that these alternatives, while valuable, operate within geopolitical contexts, which can 
both catalyse or disable their political ambitions.  
 
The Origins of Syrian Development 
The Syrian Arab Republic emerged from the French colonial mandate, following the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire during the First World War. The colonial mandate system left most social structures, 
characterised by systems of patronage, linking direct producers with the imperial center, in place. 
Liberal reforms brought only few changes to the social structures, but allowed for private property 
and, hence, the limited development of a landed class [35, p244]. This was radically reversed once 
Syria gained full independence in 1946. Development was strongly characterised by the anti-colonial, 
geopolitical vision of Syrian Arab independence of the Ba’athist regime. Nationalising all land by 
removing the colonial landed nobility was part of a semi-socialist experiment empowering the state 
bureaucracy and the military [35, p246]. In line with a defensive thinking on national autonomy, this 
regime included visions of agricultural self-sufficiency, which, however started showing cracks and 
contradictions in the 1970s. This led to a liberalisation of the land regime, or infitah, bringing back 
some of the old landed elites, while still relying heavily on oil income to subsidise food production 
[55].  
 
These policies also implied an ethno-demographic element, marginalising minorities, such as the 
Kurds. Traditionally settled in the north of the country, they became the target of ‘Arabization’, or 
Arab Belt policies, turning the Kurdish majority areas in the north of the country into primary 
commodity production. Having traditionally been viewed as the ‘breadbasket’ of Syria, this 
marginalisation involved limitations on political rights, sometimes including citizenship itself. 
Infrastructure investments, including those in energy, were in line with this policy. Low-yielding wheat 
and beans used dry farming and landless Kurdish labour. The fertile high yielding and water intensive 
production in the Euphrates valley was left in the control of loyal Arab tribes. All processing remained 
located in areas closer to the centres of power in Damascus and Aleppo. Similarly, oil drilling was 
separated from refining, channelling surplus value and economic wealth of fossil resources away from 
the locales of production. In other words, the Ba’athist state saw the Kurdish areas mostly from an 
internal colonial perspective politically maintaining uneven development.  
 
When the Syrian civil war broke out in 2011, partly in reaction to the job losses, rural poverty and 
environmental degradation resulting from renewed neoliberal policies, the Assad regime withdrew 
from the northern areas to concentrate its forces against the greater threat of the ‘Free Syrian Army’ 
(FSA). After the withdrawal was complete in 2014, the Kurdish political movement not only organised 
militarily, building up Kurdish People’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, YPG) and the 
associated Women’s Protection Units (Yekîneyên Parastina Jin YPJ), but also initiated a ‘libertarian’ 
confederalist municipalist project borrowed from the American anarchist thinker Murray Bookchin. 
At its core, the project intends to build up decentralised communal political structures in local 
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assemblies and specialised committees, circumventing, if not directly challenging the traditional 
structures of the nation-state [12]. This also includes principles of social ecology and feminism as the 
two associated pillars. Social ecology aims at a more sustainable form of communal and cooperative 
agricultural production, dissolving the hierarchy between man and nature. To Bookchin, ecological 
exploitation and the cartesian ontology that enables it are one of many expressions of old, socially 
corrosive hierarchical class and gender relations that are maintained by the state to favour capitalism. 
Thus, dissolving relationships of domination, both of ‘man over man’, ‘men over women’ and 
‘humanity over nature’ is part of a strategy of social change, rethinking society along an open-ended 
dialectic [7]. This includes a dialectical naturalism, rather than ecological monism, which allows for the 
formulation of future restorative relations with nature, including technological innovation. While 
introduced by Murray Bookchin, the use of ‘Social Ecology’ here exceeds the original main purpose of 
developing this concept as a political building block of his “democratic confederalist”, decentralised, 
cooperative economy. This term may well be used more widely and more analytically, implying that 
all social relations are at the same time ecological (as well as energetic) relations [81]. The term is 
more specific and more programmatic in its focus on nature-society relations than ‘social relations’, 
however, it is not meant to replace the latter here.  
In practice, an integral part of this project now formally organised as the “Democratic Federal System 
in Northern Syria”, was to reverse years of political marginalisation and deliberate underdevelopment. 
These plans were, however, conditioned by the geopolitical situation, both positively as well as 
negatively. First, the YPG’s existential struggle against the so-called ‘Islamic State’ (IS), or Daesh, 
eventually created a geopolitical space, protected by great powers, for the project to thrive and 
expand territorially. This includes control over valuable land, water and oil resources. Despite the 
public focus on the IS oil trade for the fiscal maintenance of its rule, controlling large parts of the 
fertile, high yielding river valleys along the Euphrates and its tributaries was more important for its 
fiscal income than oil revenues [71]. Syria’s major water and energy infrastructure, including three 
strategically important hydro-electric dams constructed by the Ba’athist developmental vision, are 
also located in the valley [77]. Left with the legacy of internal colonialism, Kurdish held areas, by 
contrast, had relied mostly on pump irrigation using poorly refined fuel. This made the opportunity to 
capture dams and their electric potential an attractive side effect in their struggle against IS.   
 
Energy and Social Ecology  
Apart from the agricultural transformation towards sustainable cultivation, crops rotation, 
cooperatives and self-sufficiency, social ecology entails the ‘democratization’ of energy as well as low 
carbon growth. This ambition to escape the fate of the ‘rentier state’ faces major challenges. One, it 
raises the question of how to incorporate the by now significant oil resources under the federation’s 
control, avoiding a resource curse. Given the project is not per se anti-developmentalist, its current 
energy needs, including those for agriculture and irrigation, are mostly met by fossil fuel based 
generators, which tend to break down due to the poor quality of the oil [70]. Two, the oil wealth in 
northern Syria is central to maintaining the war effort, including revenues from sales to third parties, 
mainly the Syrian government. Third, according to the traditional logic of pipelines and the valorisation 
of oil in international energy markets, there is some speculation whether the project would be funded 
by the potential proceeds from independent exports via the Eastern Mediterranean. Such a strategy 
would privilege a geo-territorial logic over the political substance of the project. However, a de-facto 
embargo and the lack of expertise in oil technology make these options less likely. The lack of refinery 
capacity or market access means that the oil wealth is to be retained domestically which may benefit 
future reconstruction efforts. Consciousness about the project of social ecology also means that there 
are attempts to evade this dependence on oil altogether, which leads to the planning of wind and 
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small hydro-power projects. Especially in the Afrin region, which is a de-facto enclave surrounded by 
hostile forces, this is also of strategic importance [59]. Hence, the political economy of energy in 
Rojava appears, for now, to escape the conventional energy logic of the Middle East. This is partly due 
to the revolutionary nature of the political project, taking decisions in committees and organising 
energy and agriculture in collectives, partly because of the limited geopolitical space the general 
military situation offers.  
 
Agricultural Alternatives 
Agricultural development, similarly, is an integral part of the project. Its main aim is to reverse the ills 
of the past, characterised by monocultures, heavy use of chemical fertilisers and soil exhaustion. 
Diversification is a key element, not just as a step towards food sovereignty and nutritional balance, 
but also to become more sustainable. Crops conversion proves difficult, though, as these areas also 
suffer from an embargo preventing the import of many items from seeds to fertilizers. In reaction to 
the embargo and soil exhaustion, the so-called ‘Rojava Plan’ proposes to expand local subsistence 
production using organic fertilizers, collected from local household waste [67].  
The production of organic fertilizers is the first project implementing organic self-sufficient production 
operationalizing Bookchin’s principle of social ecology and democratic confederalism, which also 
entails education as one of its other major pillars. The plan has identified a need for fertilisation in the 
broader social transformation, politicising soil health and human nutrition by integrating it into the 
system. The new system collects household organic waste, processes and redistributes it to 
agricultural cooperatives [56]. However, the introduction of the fertilizer project not only implements 
organic agriculture and helps overcoming shortages generated by a history of deliberate 
underdevelopment and the current embargo. It also provides the ground for the diversification of 
agriculture in the future [53]. It also cultivates educational tools as a key pillar in the social 
transformation intrinsic to the political project. While these experiments are still small-scale, they still 
represent a major step in the direction towards social change. However, these social innovations can 
only thrive given the abundant availability of land resources in northern Syria. For historical reasons, 
most of the land used to be state land, which has become available owed to the regime’s withdrawal. 
Questions of how to transform the social property regime underlying these changes are therefore less 
pressing as the communal self-administration doesn’t have to risk social unrest. How this would play 
out in contexts where private property is widely spread or a functioning state authority controls 
resources, land and labour more tightly.  
As the experience of northern Syria shows, it is not just the process of decision making itself and the 
everyday politics of maintaining rule in the provision of ‘soft’ public services such as education that 
are openly political and social in nature. Similarly, the ‘hard’ or physical infrastructures, from electricity 
production to agricultural infrastructure do not just provide public goods, such as food, water, shelter, 
health and energy, but are organically linked to the social project, making it ‘lively’ infrastructure [3]. 
Just like the maintenance of certain rural and urban property regimes imply the installation of 
corresponding physical structures, so does any project of socio-political change demand adaptation 
of practices of ‘infrastructuring’ [6], or geo-spatial re-modelling. This includes nature and energy 
resources beyond the extraction and valorisation of fossil fuels. And though this intention of moving 
towards a social ecology may become part of a successful challenge to dominant power 
(infra)structures, it also bears the risk of producing new contradictions.  
Here, again, the history of state-formation in the Middle East which gave a ‘tormented birth’ to the 
Syrian Arab Republic, cannot be overlooked. The formation of developmentalist post-colonial states 
in the Middle East and the way they appropriated nature in an internationally competitive process 
may still apply to the current project. The Euphrates valley has been the source of a transboundary 
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row between Ankara and Damascus in the past. Syria’s hosting of PKK bases in the 1990s was related 
to Turkey’s upstream construction of the Ataturk Dam and a transboundary water crisis that nearly 
ended in armed confrontation. Within Turkey itself, the irrigation systems surrounding the larger dam 
system, called the ‘Southeast Anatolian Project’ were designed to socially control a marginalized 
Kurdish workforce in newly established irrigated farms. When the YPG gained control over the hydro-
electric facilities on the Euphrates, the Tishreen and the Tabqa dams, this offered opportunities, 
sustaining the reconstruction effort and maintaining self-sufficiency in electricity supply. However, it 
also generated a major source of geopolitical vulnerability. Having declared the Democratic Federal 
System in Northern Syria an existential threat, Turkey now withholds water upstream, only to release 
it in intermittently, causing shortages in electricity and water supply as well as floods [65]. Internal 
contradictions like the question of how, if at all, to market fossil resources and external problems, 
such as the transboundary issues along the Euphrates constitute challenges to the praxis of social 
ecology.  
However, it is precisely here in the realm of practicing a social ecology under the conditions of warfare 
and isolation that a more inclusive notion of energy comes to fruition. Looking exclusively at hydro-
carbons in a complex civil war environment doesn’t offer a meaningful insight. It neglects different 
forms of energy like agriculture and the social regimes that sustain them, including property and 
labour relations, but also geopolitics. Just as hydrocarbons themselves, newly opened geopolitical 
spaces don’t just constrain social development, but also enable alternative energy relations as vehicles 
for socio-political alternatives.  
 
4 Conclusion 
The preceding story of alternative social energy relations in northern Syria serves to demonstrate that 
conventional assumptions about a structural determination of rentier states by the political economy 
of hydrocarbons embedded within competitive geopolitical relations is not a natural social order in 
the Middle East. A long history of colonialism, state-formation and dynamic geopolitical relations from 
the cold war to the Arab-Israeli conflict, have shaped the contemporary regional order and the political 
forms taking shape within it. Typically, this involved post-colonial, developmentalist and militarized 
regimes, socially engineering society and nature top-down for defensively in a competitive regional 
order. Social energy relations, from the local to the global, are an integral part of these socio-historical 
dynamics more than determining them top-down.  
 
This confirms the basic assumptions set out from the start, namely that nature is political, however, 
not in static, deterministic or universal ways. Local ecologies and conflicts are not natural outcomes 
of the political economy of energy, but are mediated by historically specific imperial and post-colonial 
developmental regimes and their position within regional and global orders. Rather than determining 
social life, the way in which energy is socialized and politicised into these complex environments is 
spatio-temporally specific. ‘Social Energy’ is more than just the mathematical or quantifiable 
equivalent of kinetic energy, heat and entropy. It is better understood as a field of social struggle with 
an inherent potential for social empowerment and, hence, change. Applied to the Middle East, this 
means that the sociology of energy has the potential to overcome deeply orientalist analyses 
portraying the region as determined by its physical-geological properties, inevitably leading to social 
corrosion and instability. While energy, and specifically fossil fuel extraction and marketization are 
indeed central to understanding the region’s geopolitical dynamics, the current argument emphasized 
the complex, historically grown and geopolitically dynamic relations of the region. This includes, first 
and foremost to identify the human social motivations behind the region’s energy relations, their 
historical constitution are all parts of this story. Second, it was argued that agriculture, soil, nutrition, 
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human labour and the social property regimes within which they exist, are central to understanding 
this broader notion of social energy. Third, a socially dynamic non-deterministic notion of geopolitics 
was introduced to complement this picture. Energy is subsequently re-defined into a political 
category, a field of social change rather than a limiting biophysical structure. The concept of Social 
Energy, thus, overcomes the notion of nature as an asocial, constraining externality into an integral 
part of social analysis and a potential source of social transformation in the Middle East.  
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